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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
: Case No. 950696-CA 
Plaintiff and Appellee, : (consolidated cases) 
vs. : 
: Category No. 2 
BRENT JACKSON, RAQUEL NIELSEN : 
AND PATRICIA E. SMITH, 
Defendants and Appellants. : 
AMENDED BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS1 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdictional authority is conferred upon the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to §78-2a-3(2) (f) , Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. Is the affidavit submitted in support of the search 
warrant lacking a substantial basis for issuance of a warrant, and 
therefore, fatally flawed? 
II. Does the Utah Constitution protect Utah citizens' 
reasonable expectation of privacy in residential trash placed in a 
city-provided container and left at the edge of the city street for 
pickup? 
Pursuant to stipulation of Frederic J. Voros, Jr. Assistant Utah Attorney 
General, this amended brief replaces the original brief of appellants, filed 
with this Court on the 31st day of July, 1996. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES, ETC. 
United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 14. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from the trial court's final Judgment of 
conviction entered on the 10th day of October, 1995. Defendants 
further appeal from the trial court's denial of their Motion to 
Suppress Evidence, which denial was included in the trial court's 
Ruling On Defendants' Motion To Suppress entered on the 23rd day of 
March, 1995. Defendants' Notice of Appeal was filed in the trial 
court on the 18th day of October, 1995. 
In the early morning hours of the 8th day of June of 1994, 
Sergeant Jerry Harper, of the Provo City Police Department searched 
two trash receptacles placed in the street for collection in front 
of the Defendants' home. According to the affidavit in support of 
the requested warrant, the officer identified no reason for the 
search of the trash cans. He did, however, mention two previous 
2 
incidents involving the residents: 1) approximately 36 days prior 
to the search of the trash receptacles, one of the residents had 
pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana and paraphernalia [the 
underlying offense giving rise to such guilty plea was committed on 
15 January, 1993 - 509 days prior to presentment of the affidavit 
to the magistrate] and 2) approximately 56 days prior to the search 
of the receptacles, the residents were victims of an aggravated 
burglary and aggravated robbery in which several men forced their 
way into Defendants' home and held them captive while demanding 
money and drugs. 
Based on the results of the search conducted by Sergeant 
Harper an affidavit was prepared and submitted to a magistrate. 
The magistrate issued a search warrant also on the 8th day of June 
shortly before noon. It authorized a day time search and a "no-
knock" entry. The warrant was executed shortly before 5:00 p.m. on 
the 8th of June, 1994. Various items of controlled substances and 
paraphernalia were discovered in the home and seized. Each of the 
three defendants was charged with possession of controlled 
substances and paraphernalia. Defendants filed their written 
Motion to Suppress Evidence seeking a ruling from the trial court 
that the subject search warrant was improperly issued. Oral 
argument on such motion was heard on February 7, 1995. The trial 
court issued its ruling denying the motion on the 23rd day of 
March, 1995. Defendants subsequently entered conditional pleas of 
guilty on the 14th day of August, 1995, to an Amended Information 
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alleging two counts, to wit: possession of marijuana in a drug 
free zone, a class A misdemeanor, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia in a drug free zone, also a class A misdemeanor, 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
There did not exist a substantial basis for the magistrate to 
have issued the search warrant under an analysis based on the 
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or under 
an analysis based on Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. The evidence of certain statements of the Defendants 
which were included in the affidavit filed in support of the search 
warrant were improperly included in the affidavit and should have 
been redacted from the affidavit and not considered by the trial 
court in reviewing the validity of the search warrant. 
The Constitution of Utah recognizes as reasonable Defendants' 
expectation of privacy in the contents of their residential garbage 
containers left at curbside for collection by the municipal garbage 
department. The evidence obtained by the police officers pursuant 
to a warrantless search of Defendants' residential garbage 
containers, prior to the issuance of the subject search warrant, 
should have been ruled illegally obtained; that evidence obtained 
from the warrantless garbage container search should therefore have 
been redacted from the affidavit and not considered by the trial 
court in reviewing the validity of the search warrant. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The affidavit submitted in support of the search 
warrant lacked a substantial basis for issuance 
of a warrant, and is therefore, fatally flawed 
A. Standard of Review 
The United States Supreme Court has adopted a "totality of the 
circumstances" test to determine if a magistrate properly found 
probable cause to issue a search warrant.2 In so holding the Court 
directed that "[a] magistrate's 'determination of probable cause 
should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.'"3 "'A grudging 
or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants,! is 
inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for 
searches conducted pursuant to a warrant; 'courts should not 
invalidate warrant[s] by interpreting affidavit[s] in a hyper 
technical, rather than a common sense, manner.'"4 
While the United States Supreme Court has required that an 
affidavit provide only a "substantial basis for ... concluding that 
a search warrant would uncover evidence of wrongdoing", and that 
"[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a 
practical, common sense decision whether, given all the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, ... there is a 
2Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
3Gates, above, citing Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). 
4Gates, above, citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965). 
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fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular placet,]" the Court also stressed that "[i]n 
order to ensure that ... an abdication of a magistrate's duty does 
not occur, courts must continue to conscientiously review the 
sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants are issued." 5 
The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule was made applicable to 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.6 The Utah Supreme 
Court has recognized this review-of-warrants test articulated by 
the United States Supreme Court.7 
B. Insubstantial basis for issuance of the warrant 
For the following reasons, the affidavit in this case did not 
provide the magistrate with a substantial basis to conclude that 
contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in the residence 
located at 1033 West 770 South, Provo, Utah. 
1) Irrelevant paragraphs 
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that information that does 
not aid the magistrate in his probable cause determination is 
irrelevant in a review of whether the warrant was properly issued.6 
Paragraphs 1., 2., 3., 4., 9., 10., 11., and 12. do not provide for 
Gates, above. 
6Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
7State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983); State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 
1099 (Utah 1985); State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987 (1989); State v. Thurman, 846 
P.2d 1256. 
eState v Potter, 860 P.2d 952 (Ut. App., 1993). 
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a probable cause determination and are, therefore, irrelevant to 
any review of whether the warrant was properly issued. 
Paragraph 1. sets out the affiant's police training and 
experience. Nothing in this paragraph directly helped the 
magistrate determine if contraband would probably be in the subject 
residence. Defendants concede that, indirectly, the officer's 
experience in the recognition of marijuana stems and seeds would 
have aided the magistrate's determination of the nature of 
substances found in their residential garbage container. Defendants 
will argue below, however, that the mere existence of such 
substances in their residential garbage container, on the street, 
did not establish a fair probability that the same substances would 
be found in their residence. 
Paragraphs 2. and 3. give no clue as to why one should 
conclude that drugs would probably be in this residence. 
Paragraphs 4. details Provo City's system of residential 
garbage service. As with paragraph 1., it does not directly provide 
probable cause for the existence of contraband in the house. And, 
as with paragraph 1., this paragraph may have provided the 
magistrate with some insight into the connection of a garbage 
container to the subject residence, but again, Defendants will 
argue below that existence of illegal substances in the garbage 
containers did not provide probable cause to believe such 
substances would still be in the residence. 
7 
Paragraphs 9.and 10. are generic or canned statements of the 
affiant's experience with other drug users and provided the 
magistrate with no information that evidence of illegal activity 
would probably be found in the subject residence. Paragraph 11. 
simply describes the exterior of the residence. Paragraph 12. 
recites the affiant's subjective expectations. Neither of these two 
paragraphs would have aided the magistrate in his probable cause 
determination. 
Paragraphs 1., 2., 3., 4., 9., 10., 11., and 12. cannot be 
construed to establish probable cause that evidence of criminal 
activity would be found in Defendants' house. If this warrant is to 
stand, it must be on the strength of the totality of paragraphs 5., 
6 ., 7 ., and 8. 
2) Staleness 
Facts set out in an affidavit which are stale are likewise 
irrelevant to the magistrate's probable cause determination. Facts 
are stale "when a significant lapse of time occurs between the 
discovery of the information suggesting that evidence of the crime 
can be found at a particular locale and the magistrate's finding of 
probable cause or the execution of the warrant. The concern is 
whether so much time has passed that there is no longer probable 
cause to believe that the evidence is still at the targeted 
locale."9 Paragraphs 2., 3., 4., 5., 6., 7., and 8. of the 
9State v Hansen. 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987); State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256 
(Utah 1993) . 
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affidavit provided the magistrate with stale facts that could not 
support the warrant. 
a) Staleness of "evidence" within the garbage container 
Paragraphs 4., 5., 6., 7., and 8, of the affidavit establish 
that the affiant searched through the contents of two garbage 
containers, each marked "1033" corresponding with the street 
address of the subject house and each situated on the street in 
front of the subject residence. Paragraph 4. recites that the 
residential garbage containers in Provo are set on the street once 
a week for pick up by a city truck. Paragraphs 6., 7., and 8. 
detail how the affiant found small ("user") amounts of marijuana 
and paraphernalia in the can and that the containers also had trash 
directly associated with Pat Smith and Brent Jackson. 
With this information and assuming that the two cans were 
routinely placed on the street for collection each week, the 
magistrate could conclude - at best - only that the marijuana and 
paraphernalia found in them were discarded no more than 1 week 
prior. But since the affidavit contained no information that the 
affiant had watched the two containers to determine when they had 
last been emptied by Provo City trucks, the assumption that the 
trash within them had been discarded from the residence within the 
week immediately prior cannot be fairly made. It is equally 
rational to conclude that this residence's garbage was not taken to 
the street on a weekly basis, either because of habit, neglect, an 
9 
intervening vacation, or several other logical reasons. Without 
information as to the most recent time the containers had been 
collected, the magistrate had no basis to determine the "age" of 
the garbage, he could only guess as to how long the trash had been 
in them, and by extension how recently contraband may have been in 
the residence. On its face, the affidavit does not establish 
whether contraband would have been in the residence 1 week prior, 2 
weeks prior, 8 weeks prior, 6 months prior, etc. The information 
in these paragraphs is stale and cannot be a basis for the issuance 
of a warrant. 
b) Staleness of evidence of prior bad acts 
Similarly, paragraphs 2. and 3. contain stale information 
having no application to the magistrate's probable cause 
determination. Besides providing no facts from which to conclude 
contraband was probably in the residence, the information in these 
two paragraphs concerns occurrences that were 56 and 509 days old 
respectively. Utah appellate courts have found such remote facts to 
be totally useless in the probable cause determination.10 This 
reviewing court should likewise rule that the information from 
these two paragraphs provided the magistrate with no probable cause 
for the issuance of the warrant. 
State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640 (Ut. App., 1993); State v. Viah, 871 P.2d 
1030 (Ut. App., 1994). 
10 
3) Use of improper information 
Paragraph 2. of the supporting affidavit told the magistrate 
that armed intruders had entered the subject residence and that 
"[a]ccording to Smith and Jackson the men held them captive for 
several hours demanding drugs and money. The men wanted to know 
where the drugs were." 
On 17 May, 1994, 3 weeks prior to the date of the sworn 
affidavit, each of these Defendants was granted immunity by the 
Utah County Attorney for "any crime disclosed by [their] testimony 
arising out of incidents which occurred on April 13, 1994, ..." 
The United States Supreme Court has held that if false 
information has been knowingly and intentionally or recklessly 
included in an affidavit sought to support a search warrant, such 
information must be redacted from the affidavit. If the affidavit 
then lacks probable cause, the evidence seized pursuant to the 
warrant must be suppressed as if the improper information had not 
been originally included in the affidavit.11 The Utah Supreme Court 
has recognized such a procedure.12 The Utah Supreme Court has 
further extended this reasoning to include misstatements which 
occur because information is omitted.13 
UFranks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 
12State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110 (Utah 1986). 
13State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986). 
11 
In providing the information in paragraph 2., the affiant 
failed to advise the magistrate that each Defendant had been 
granted immunity in consideration for their testimony involving the 
13 April incident. Also omitted from the affidavit was information 
that further evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing for the 
aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery indicated that the 
intruders may have been looking for a man named "Fransisco" who may 
have resided in and moved from the same residence before these 
Defendants moved into it. 
In addition to being stale and of only marginal help to the 
magistrate in his probable cause determination, paragraph 2. 
recklessly omitted information from the magistrate which would have 
established that the statements within the paragraph were 
privileged and of even more dubious value than might be facially 
apparent. Accordingly, this paragraph should have been excluded 
from the affidavit and the warrant should be assessed as if the 
affidavit did not originally include this information. 
4) Evidence found in the garbage did not indicate that the 
same substances were probably inside the residence 
In addition to being stale, the evidence of marijuana and 
paraphernalia in the two garbage containers was of only marginal 
value in a determination of whether similar items were probably in 
the residence. 
As stated in paragraph 8., the evidence indicated "possession 
of small amounts for use." It was not indicated that inventories 
12 
for distribution were present or expected. The "stems, seeds," and 
"small piece of marijuana," as well as the generally minute 
quantities of evidence found in the containers was indicative of 
the "dregs" or remnants of a small personal-use amount that had 
already been consumed. The nature of the evidence was also 
consistent with a small amount that may have, on an isolated 
occasion, been brought into the house, used, and the remnants 
discarded by a guest. Additionally, because the affiant did not 
indicate when the containers were taken to the street, nor that the 
containers were kept under surveillance once on the street until 
searched, and because once on the street the containers were 
accessible to third parties, the contraband could have been placed 
in them by strangers or neighbors. 
Defendants do not argue that the magistrate's determination of 
probable cause must necessarily exclude all other possibilities. 
But, the affidavit must establish a "fair probability" that 
evidence will be found where it is sought. The conclusion that 
contraband was probably still in the house was not supported by 
corroborating evidence. From the affidavit it was at least as 
likely that contraband in the cans originated with a house guest, a 
stranger, or a neighbor. Defendants argue that where, as here, the 
evidence points equally to several possibilities, a finding of 
probable cause that one of many possibilities is most likely, is 
not justified without corroborating evidence. 
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5) Isolated nature of evidence 
Where the affidavit recites a mere isolated violation it 
would not be unreasonable to imply that probable cause 
dwindles rather quickly with the passage of time. 
However, where the affidavit properly recites facts 
indicating activity of a protracted and continuous 
nature, a course of conduct, the passage of time becomes 
less significant. United States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285 
(10th Cir., 1972) .14 
The affidavit recites the one-time presence of a small amount 
of contraband indicative of personal use. The affidavit did not 
indicate contraband had been found in the same garbage containers 
on other dates. No evidence was provided to the magistrate that 
contraband probably was in the residence on other occasions. Taken 
in its best light, the affidavit merely recited the presence of a 
small amount of contraband in the residence's garbage on one 
isolated date. The affidavit did not indicate a protracted pattern 
of usage sufficient to postulate that similar substances might 
routinely be in the home. Neither did the affidavit establish a 
course of conduct consistent with repeated drug use or possession 
in the home. The isolated presence of a small amount of contraband 
that may have been discarded 1 week, 2 weeks, or more, prior to 
discovery by the police has a dwindling probable cause value as an 
indicator that contraband may still be in the home. 
State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987); State v. Strombera, 783 P.2d 
54 (Ut. App., 1989); State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284 (Ut. App., 1990); State v. 
Singleton, 854 P.2d 1017 (Ut. App., 1993). 
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6) Failure to preserve evidence 
Paragraph 6. of the affidavit recites that marijuana and 
paraphernalia were found in Defendants1 garbage. It was further 
indicated in that paragraph that the marijuana field tested 
positive for marijuana. However, the record of this case does not 
indicate that the contraband was preserved or made an exhibit to 
the affidavit. Consequently, it is impossible for this court to 
adequately review the assertion that contraband was found in the 
two garbage containers. Where, as in this case, a warrant is based 
substantially on the seizure of real evidence, such evidence should 
be preserved for the record, first for examination by the issuing 
magistrate and ultimately for review by the trial or appellate 
court. The failure to preserve the evidence disadvantages the 
Defendants and should be a factor considered by this court in 
assessing the adequacy of the facts supporting the warrant. 
C. Good Faith exception 
The United States Supreme Court has held that evidence 
obtained by police officers acting in good faith, objectively and 
reasonable relying on a search warrant issued by a neutral and 
objective and detached magistrate, should not be excluded even if 
the warrant is found to be legally insufficient by reason of lack 
of probable cause. 15The Leon Court also noted four exceptions 
where good faith will not save an invalid warrant: 1) the warrant 
1 5 U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Leon, 468 U . S . 897 ( 1 9 8 4 ) . 
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was issued by a magistrate who was misled by false information, 2) 
the magistrate abandons his neutral and detached objectivity, 3) 
the affidavit is so lacking in probable cause that it is 
unreasonable for the officer to rely on it, 4) the warrant is so 
facially deficient in describing the place to be searched or the 
thing to be seized that the officer cannot legally rely on it.16 
If this court should determine that the affidavit lacked 
sufficient probable cause to support the issuance of the search 
warrant, it should further rule that because the affiant also 
served the warrant, he could not ignore the requirement to present 
the magistrate with probable cause for the warrant and then claim 
that the failure to do so constitutes good faith.17 
POINT II 
The Utah Constitution protects Utah citizens' reasonable 
expectation of privacy in residential trash placed 
in a city provided container and left at 
the edge of the city street for pickup 
A. Standard of Review 
Defendants have found no Utah case which specifically holds 
that the standard of review of warrants under Article I, Section 14 
of the Utah Constitution is significantly different than the United 
States Supreme Court's standard under the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. The Utah Court of Appeals has stated 
Leon, above. 
Leon, above; State v. Dronebura, 781 P.2d 1303 (Ut. App., 1989); State 
v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Ut. App., 1991). 
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that it considers that the Utah Supreme Court has had ample 
opportunity to pronounce a different standard and that because it 
lhas not, the prevailing federal standard of review also applies to 
any review of the Utah Constitution guarantees against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.18 Defendants therefore analyze the issuance 
of the warrant in this case, under the Utah Constitution, by 
applying the standards set forth in Gates, above. 
The Utah Supreme Court recognizes that an exclusionary rule is 
proper to insure the guarantees of Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution.19 Therefore, exclusion of all evidence seized 
pursuant to the warrant is proper if the warrant is deemed issued 
in violation of Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah. 
B. The Utah Constitution recognizes Defendants' reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their residential garbage 
Defendants1 argument, above, that the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution does not support the issuance of the 
warrant in this case acknowledges that the United States Supreme 
Court has held that the Fourth Amendment allows a warrantless 
search of a citizen's garbage left curbside and outside of the 
residential curtilage, for the reason that the United States 
Supreme Court does not recognize an expectation of privacy in 
1SSalt Lake City v. Truiillo, 854 P.2d 603 (Ut. App., 1993); State v. 
Singleton, 854 P.2d 1017 (Ut. App., 1993). 
19State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990); State v Thompson, 810 P.2d 
415 (1991). 
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garbage so situated.20In contrast, Defendants here argue that 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah does recognize an 
expectation of privacy in residential garbage, even when placed 
outside the curtilage for collection by the municipal authority. 
In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) the United 
States Supreme Court developed the two-part test to determine if 
one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a place searched. 
First, defendant must assert a subjective expectation of privacy in 
the searched area. Second, society must accept such expectation of 
privacy as reasonable. Likewise, the Utah Supreme Court has held 
that an expectation of privacy is the threshold criterion for 
determining if Article I, Section 14 applies.21 Defendants argue 
that, unlike the Fourth Amendment, Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution can be reasonably interpreted to reflect that 
Utah society would recognize and accept their expectation of 
privacy in their residential garbage left at curbside. 
1) The Utah Constitution can recognize freedoms not 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution 
A state court may interpret its own constitution in a manner 
different from the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of 
a similar federal provision,22 so long as it does not reach a 
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
21State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991). 
22Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 
U.S. 117 (1945); Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Comm., 379 U.S. 487 (1965). 
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result providing its citizens with less rights than those 
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.23 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "it is imperative that 
Utah lawyers brief this Court on relevant state constitutional 
questions."24 On several occasions Utah's highest court has shown a 
willingness to make substantive law based solely on the Utah 
Constitution. See, e.g. American Fork City v. Cosgrove, 701 P.2d 
1069 (Utah 1985) (scope of privilege against self-incrimination); 
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984) (automobile guest 
statute); State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 515 (Utah 1984) (questioning a 
juror about drinking alcohol); Gray v. Employment Security, 681 
P.2d 807 (Utah 1984)(Durham, J. concurring and dissenting, due 
process in re: unemployment benefits); State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 
460 (Utah 1990) (automobile exception to search warrant); State v. 
Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991) (expectation of privacy in bank 
records); Zissi v. State Tax Commission of Utah, 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 
1992) (Utah Constitutional exclusionary rule prevents admission of 
illegally seized evidence at Commission hearing). On other 
occasions the Court has suggested it is inviting argument on Utah 
Constitution Article I, Section 14, specifically.25 
23Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984). 
24State v. Hyah, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985); State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 
(Utah 1986). 
25State v. Hyah, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985); State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 
(Utah 1986); State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988); Durham, Employing the 
Utah Constitution, 2 Utah Bar Journal 25 (Nov., 1989). 
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From the above it is clear that Utah's appellate courts have 
the authority to interpret Utah's constitutional search and seizure 
provisions differently than the corresponding federal provision. 
The Utah Supreme Court has invited discussions of Utah 
Constitutional principals, has established a history of reaching 
them, and, has developed Utah Constitutional law in variance with 
federal law. In this context, it is proper for this court to 
consider an interpretation of the Utah Constitution which may be 
different from the federal constitutional holding. Oregon Justice 
Hans Linde has stated: "A lawyer today representing someone who 
claims some constitutional protection and who does not argue that 
the state constitution provides that protection is skating on the 
edge of malpractice."26 It would be equally shortsighted for this 
court not to entertain such a state-based argument. 
2) The Utah Constitution can reasonably be interpreted to 
recognize an expectation of privacy in one's residential 
garbage left at curbside, outside of the curtilage 
Defendants argue that the Utah Constitution recognizes an 
expectation of privacy in one's residential garbage left at 
curbside for collection by a municipal authority, notwithstanding 
that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution does 
not. The argument is founded on a) the societal and historical 
context of the Utah Constitution, b) the "primacy model", and c) 
analogous holdings and reasoning. 
Welsh & Collins, Taking State Constitutions Seriously, 14 The Center 
Mag. 6, 12 (Sept./Oct. 1981). 
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a) Societal and constitutional historical context 
It is generally not disputed that Utah's history is unique. 
The original (non-native) settlers were literally driven out of 
settlements in three other states (primarily for their religious 
practices and because of jealousy of their economic successes and 
mistrust of their tight-knit ecclesiastically oriented society) 
while governments in the other states at best turned a blind eye to 
their banishment and at worst acted with complicity. The settlers 
came to the west in an attempt to isolate themselves from 
persecution and to create an autonomous society. Their migration to 
the great basin was one of the largest mass migrations in the 
history of America.28 The initial government of the immigrants was 
comprised of the leaders of their religion (The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter Day Saints [Mormons]) until the first of seven 
attempts at a constitution was drafted in 1849 (The Constitution of 
the State of Deseret) .29 
In this portion of this memorandum and in the next succeeding sub-
section Defendants have borrowed extensively from Kenneth L. Wallentme, Heeding 
the Call: Search and Seizure Jurisprudence Under the Utah Constitution, Article 
I, Section 14, as well as briefing from previous appellate arguments provided by 
Ronald J. Yengich and Hakeem Ishola. Use of information from these works has 
been previously approved by Messrs. Wallentme, Yengich, and Ishola. The 
assistance and collegiality of these three gentlemen is acknowledged and greatly 
appreciated. 
Also Society of Separatiomsts v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993), 
provides a similar analysis of Utah's unique history. In this case the Utah 
Supreme Court held that because of Utah's unique history a ruling can follow a 
different line of analysis than has been used in the federal context. 
28 
John J. Flynn, Federalism and Viable State Government - The History of 
Utah's Constitution, 1966 Utah Law Review 311. 
29 
Flynn, at 315; see also, Peter Crawley, The constitution of the State of 
Deseret, 29 BYU Studies 7 (1989). 
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"[The] Constitution of the State of Deseret was as much a 
public relations piece as an application for statehood, a document 
designed to show that the traditional political processes were 
alive and well in Deseret. . .. Although the federal constitution 
was the ultimate prototype, there is little doubt that [it] was 
derived from the Iowa Constitution of 184 6.ff30 "In many respects 
the constitution of 1849 was similar to the Illinois Constitution 
of 1818, the constitution the Mormons had lived under in Nauvoo, 
Illinois."31 From this first attempt at a written constitution 
followed six more attempts in 1856, 1862, 1872 (which used the 
Nevada Constitution of 1864 as a model), 1882, 1887, and 1895 
(which borrowed heavily from earlier attempts at a Utah 
constitution as well as from the Constitutions of Nevada, 
Washington, Illinois, and New York). This final draft was approved 
by voters on 5 November, 1895. President Grover Cleveland 
proclaimed Utah a state on 4 January, 1896.32 
Heavily influencing the effort at arriving at a constitution 
that would be acceptable both to the inhabitants of the area and 
the U.S. Congress was the Mormon church's official pronouncement 
embracing the practice of plural marriage (polygamy) in 1852.33 All 
Crawley, at 15. 
31Flynn, at 315. 
32Flynn, at 316-325. 
Linford, The Mormons and the Law: The Polygamy cases, 9 Utah Law Review 
308 (1964). 
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drafting attempts after 1852 were undoubtedly affected by federal 
displeasure with such official practice.^4 
Official U.S. Congressional attempts to prosecute polygamy 
were the Morrill Act of 1862 and the Edmunds-Tucker Act of 1882.35 
These Acts were not directed at the riff-raff and disenfranchised. 
Rather, "[b]y indicting the [Mormon] Church's leading figures, the 
government sought to set a vivid example for rank and file members, 
paralyze the Church's leadership, and cow the Mormon populace into 
submission to federal policy."'16 The federal plan ultimately worked 
- the Church's leadership was cornered into renouncing its 
endorsement of polygamy if any hope of statehood was to be 
realized. "By 1893, after the Church had renounced polygamy and 
prosecutions had largely ceased, there had been 1004 convictions 
for unlawful cohabitation and thirty-one for polygamy."^ The 1887 
Constitution contained a criminal law punishing polygamy16 and the 
Constitution of 1895 included Article III, providing, inter alia, 
"polygamous or plural marriages are forever prohibited.",0 
Statehood quickly followed in two months. 
14Flynn, at 316. 
Firmage, Religion & the Law: The Mormon Experience in the Nineteenth 
Century, 12 Cardozo Law Review 765, (1991). 
Firmage, at 772. 
Firmage, at 775; see also, L. Amngton, Great Basin Kingdom An 
Economic History of the Latter Day Saints 1830 - 1900, (1958). 
38Flynn, at 320. 
39Constitution of Utah, Article III, First: (1896). 
23 
Mormons, a close and self sufficient society, suffered from 
organized persecution that was not held in check (and quite 
probably was encouraged) by three separate state governments. They 
undertook an arduous mass migration over great distances to both 
avoid the persecution and maintain their monolithic religious-based 
society. Once they arrived here they were made the further target 
of almost fifty years of federal pressure because of Congress1 
disapproval of their belief in polygamy. Ultimately, before the 
citizens of Utah were allowed acceptance into the union, the church 
which formed the foundation of their society, was forced to take 
the degrading step of publicly denouncing what had been a basic 
religious tenet (polygamy). 
In this setting, for the fifty years immediately preceding 
acceptance into the union, several attempts were made at drafting a 
state constitution that would placate Congress. The seventh draft, 
prohibiting polygamy, finally secured statehood. The development of 
the State's present constitution and the intent of its various 
provisions, cannot be assessed without an appreciation of these 
dynamics. 
Article I, Section 14 (prohibition against unreasonable 
searches) was drafted by a people who thrice were not protected by 
their local governments from mob violence, who - at the risk of 
annihilation - fled to a place of total isolation from other 
societies and all governments, who endured ridicule and systematic 
federal prosecution of their membership as well as their leaders 
24 
for a core religious belief (the evidence for such prosecutions -
plural wives and co-habitants - being harbored in their private 
homes), who maintained a public disagreement with the federal 
government for five decades, and who were forced to suffer public 
humiliation before acceptance by the federal government, would not 
have taken lightly the intrusion of those governments into their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects. 
Article I, Section 14 is a reflection of the people's feelings 
of hostility and distrust of a government perceived as inimical to 
their beliefs if not their existence. While the people's leaders 
had the federal text as a model for this section, they were also 
personally targets of federal polygamy prosecutions.40 
Consequently, the drafters of the various attempts at a state 
constitution very likely personally experienced searches of their 
homes and effects in conjunction with Morrill and Edmunds 
investigations and prosecutions.41 The totality of this societal 
40Firmage, at 771-778. 
A 1 
See Bradley, Hide and Seek: Children of the Underground, 51 Utah 
Historical Quarterly 133 (1983) (recounting how a polygamist's home was searched 
100 times in a four year period; See also "How They Do It," Deseret News Weekly, 
January 20, 1886 at 1 (explaining how federal marshals entered a polygamist's 
home without a warrant and by breaking the door with an axe; Ivans, A 
Constitution for Utah, 25 Utah Historical Quarterly 95, 100 (1957); White, The 
Making of the Convention President: The Political Education of John Henry Smith, 
39 Utah Historical Quarterly 351,357 (1971) (detailing how John H. Smith, a 
Mormon apostle and President of the constitutional convention of 1895 practiced 
polygamy and had been the target of federal marshals' searches); Paneck, A 
peculiar People and Their Constitution: The Culture and Times of 19th Century 
Utah, 6, unpublished manuscript in the possession of Mr. Kenneth R. Wallentine 
(recording how several members of the 
subcommittee selected to draft the declaration of rights for the 1895 
constitution had publicly protested the search and seizure practices of the 
federal marshals). 
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and constitutional history of Utah, therefore, strongly suggests a 
heightened appreciation and valuation of the privacy rights in 
personal effects - particularly one's home. Accordingly, Defendants 
argue that Article I, Section 14 should be interpreted to reflect 
that Utah society would recognize as reasonable, an expectation of 
privacy in one's residential garbage. 
b) The "primacy" model 
"Primacy" means "the state of being first (as in rank)."42 The 
term "primacy model," in the context of state constitutional 
analysis has two branches. "State bills of rights are first in two 
senses: first in time and first in logic."43 
The first branch of the primacy model recognizes that 
principals of state constitutions predate the federal constitution 
which was itself patterned after the state documents: 
By 1783, thirteen states, all but Rhode Island, had 
adopted written constitutions. The majority of them 
contained most of the catalogue of civil liberties 
included in Virginia's Declaration of Rights and 
Maryland's and Delaware's and Pennsylvania's. But they 
were by no means identical. That was no accident. During 
the months preceding independence, political leaders 
debated the case for having the Constitutional Congress 
prepare uniform constitutions for the states. They 
finally rejected this idea in favor of calling upon each 
state to write a constitution satisfactory to itself.44 
^The Merriam-Webster Dictionary, G. & C. Merriam Co. (1974). 
43 
Justice Hans A. Lmde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States1 
Bills of Rights, 9 University of Baltimore Law Review 379 (1980). 
44 
Lmde, at 381; F. Green, Constitutional Development in the South 
Atlantic States, 1776-1860, at 52-56 (1930) . 
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Far from being the model for the state, the Federal Bill 
of Rights was added to the Constitution to meet demands 
for the same guarantees against the new central 
government that people had secured against their own 
local officials. Moreover, the states that adopted the 
new constitutions during the following decades took their 
bill of rights from the preexisting state constitutions 
rather from the federal amendments. 
The Federal Bill of Rights did not supersede those of the 
states. It was not interposed between the citizen and his 
state. ... Only the Civil War made it clear that it might 
sometimes be necessary to use federal law as a mode of 
doing that which a state could but did not do for itself 
- the protection of some of its citizens against those in 
control of its government. 
It is the fourteenth amendment that has bound the states 
to observe the guarantees of the Federal Bill of Rights. 
We tend to forget how recently the application of the 
Federal Bill of Rights to the states developed. 
Throughout the nineteenth century and the first quarter 
of the twentieth, state courts decided questions of 
constitutional rights under their own state 
constitutions. ... Of course, the states had all these 
guarantees in their own laws long before the Federal Bill 
of Rights was applied to the states. State courts had 
been administering these laws, sometime generously, more 
often not, for a century or more without awaiting an 
interpretation from the United States Supreme Court.45 
The second branch of the primacy model posits that "[j]ust as 
rights under the state constitutions were first in time, they are 
first also in the logic of constitutional law."46 "The primacy 
model treats the state constitution as the fundamental wellspring 
of individual rights. Federal decisions and their underlying 
Linde, at 380-382; see, also generally Note, The Utah Supreme Court and 
the Utah Constitution, 1986 Utah Law Review 319. 
46Linde, at 383. 
27 
analysis are regarded as persuasive, although not controlling, 
authority."47 As the Connecticut Supreme Court stated: 
In [civil liberty] adjudication, our first referent is 
Connecticut law and the full panoply of rights 
Connecticut residents have come to expect as their due. 
Accordingly, decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
defining fundamental rights are persuasive authority to 
be afforded respectful consideration, but they are to be 
followed by Connecticut courts only when they provide no 
less individual protection than is guaranteed by 
Connecticut law.48 
Dicta in several Utah appellate court decisions hints that the 
primacy model may be appropriate for Utah jurisprudence. Justice 
Zimmerman has noted "[t]he federal law as it currently exists is 
certainly not the only permissible interpretation of the search and 
seizure protections contained in the Utah Constitution....[s]ound 
argument may be made in favor of position at variance with the 
current federal law respecting both the scope of the individual's 
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and the 
remedy for any violation of that right."49 Defendants argue that 
the primacy model is an appropriate methodology for interpretation 
of the breadth and depth of the rights guaranteed by the Utah 
Constitution generally and by Article I, Section 14 specifically. 
Under this theory this Court is free to conclude that the Utah 
Wallentine, at 9. 
48State v Marsala, 579 A.2d 58 (Conn., 1990). 
49State v. Hvah, 711 P.2d 264, 272-273 (Utah 1985); see also Malan v. 
Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984); State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 
1988); State v Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 108 (Ut. App., 1987) (Billings, J., 
dissenting). 
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Constitution accepts as reasonable an expectation of privacy in 
one's residential garbage, irrespective of the United States 
Supreme Court's contrary position on the issue. This Court should 
so rule. 
c) Analogous holdings and reasoning 
As the United States Supreme Court held in Katz, "[wjhat a 
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or 
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. [Citation] 
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area 
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.[Citations.]"50 Five states have determined that their 
state constitutions recognize an expectation of privacy in 
residential garbage: People v. Krivda,51 486 P.2d 1262 (Cal., 
1971), State v. Tanaka, 701 P.2d 1274 (Hawaii 1985), State v. 
Hempele, 576 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1990), State v. Boland, 800 P.2d 1112 
(Wash. 1990), and Moran v. Indiana, 625 N.E.2d 1231 (Ind. 1993). 
Seemingly, implementing the reasoning of Katz, and 
notwithstanding the existence of federal court holdings to the 
contrary, the Supreme Court of Hawaii, in Tanaka, reviewed three 
Katz, above, at 351-352. 
In this case the California Supreme Court held that society is prepared 
to accept one's expectation of privacy in residential garbage set at the curb 
for collection by a municipal authority. While the Krivda decision does not 
clearly explain whether such holding is based on an interpretation of the United 
States Constitution or the California Constitution, the United States Supreme 
Court in Greenwood, above, determined that the Krivda holding was based on both 
constitutions. See Greenwood at 39. 
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warrantless residential garbage search challenges (one of which 
presented a factual setting substantially similar to the case 
before this Court) and concluded: 
The main issue is whether society is prepared to 
recognize defendants' expectation of privacy as 
reasonable.... In our view, [the Hawaii Constitution's 
search and seizure provision] recognizes an expectation 
of privacy beyond the parallel provisions in the Federal 
Bill of Rights. 
[W]e believe defendants1 expectations of privacy are ones 
society is prepared to recognize. People reasonably 
believe that police will not indiscriminately rummage 
through their trash bags to discover their personal 
effects. Business records, bills, correspondence, 
magazines, tax records, and other telltale refuse can 
reveal much about a person's activities, associations, 
and beliefs. If we were to hold otherwise, police could 
search everyone's trash bags on their property without 
any reason and thereby learn of their activities, 
associations, and beliefs. It is exactly the type of 
overbroad governmental intrusion that [the Hawaii 
Constitution's search and seizure provision] was intended 
to prevent. 
Similarly, the Hempele court, noting that "[c]lues to people's 
most private affairs can be found in their garbage...." and "[a] 
plethora of personal information can be culled from garbage: a 
single bag of trash testifies eloquently to the eating, reading, 
and recreational habits of the person who produced it[,]"52 found 
it reasonable to expect privacy in one's residential garbage. 
In Boland, the Washington Supreme Court held that "[w]hile a 
person must reasonably expect a licensed trash collector will 
Hempele. above, at 8 02-803. 
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remove the contents of his trash can, this expectation does not 
also infer an expectation of governmental intrusion."5~ 
In Moran, the Indiana Supreme Court held that [w]arrantless 
searches are presumptively unreasonable, and the burden is placed 
on the state to show that the search falls within one of the 
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. The common thread 
underlying the recognized exceptions is the concept of ^exigent 
circumstances' which render the procurement of a warrant 
impractical or inadvisable because of a danger of harm to 
individuals or the potential destruction of evidence."54 
This Court is urged to pay particular attention to the 
reasoning of Justice Brennan's dissent in the United States Supreme 
Court garbage search case (Greenwood), with whom Justice Marshall 
joined: 
Scrutiny of another's trash is contrary to commonly 
accepted notions of civilized behavior. 
1[A]lmost every human activity ultimately manifests 
itself in waste products....f [Citations] 
TIf you want to know what is really going on in a 
community, look at its garbage1 (quoting renowned 
archeologist, Emil Haury) 
It cannot be doubted that a sealed trash bag harbors 
telling evidence of the "intimate activity associated 
with the 'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of 
life.f " 
Boland, above, at 1117. 
'Mor&n, above, at 123 9. 
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Most of us, I believe, would be incensed to discover a 
meddler - whether a neighbor, a reporter, or a detective 
- scrutinizing our sealed trash containers to discover 
some detail of our personal lives. 
The mere possibility that unwelcome meddlers might open 
and rummage through the containers does not negate the 
expectation of privacy in their contents any more than 
the possibility of a burglary negates an expectation of 
privacy in the home;...'What a person ... seeks to 
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the 
public, may be constitutionally protected."[Citing to 
Katzl. (emphasis in the original). 
[T]he voluntary relinquishment of possession or control 
over an effect does not necessarily amount to a 
relinquishment of privacy expectation in it. Were it 
otherwise, a letter or package would lose all Fourth 
Amendment protection when placed in a mailbox or other 
depository. . .55 
Of additional significance to the Greenwood dissent was the 
fact that Greenwood was compelled by county ordinance to set his 
trash curbside for weekly pick-up by the municipal authority and 
prohibited from accumulating it on his property or disposing of it 
in any other fashion.56 Similarly, in Defendants1 situation, Provo 
City Revised Ordinances 7.03.080(4) (c) prohibits accumulation of 
garbage by any owner or occupier of real property "which is not 
securely protected from flies." Other provisions of the Provo City 
Revised Ordinances provide as follows: 
PCRO 11.02.010. Mandatory Residential Service by Provo City 
Greenwood, above, (Brennan and Marshall J.J., dissenting), at 1632-1637. 
Greenwood, above, (Brennan and Marshall, J.J. dissenting), at 1635-1637. 
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Provo City shall provide mandatory residential collection 
service to all structures used for human habitation, which do 
not contain more than two dwelling units.57 
PCRO 11.02.030. Regulations Applicable to Provo City 
Residential Collection. 
(1) Residential solid waste shall be collected only from 
containers obtained from Provo City. (Containers 
obtained from Provo City are specially designed for 
use in an automated collection system.) 
(3) Except where the director shall otherwise agree, 
collections shall be made from the street. 
Containers shall be placed at the edge of the street 
in a manner that will allow a collection truck to be 
driven to the side of the container. 
As in Greenwood, Defendants here were compelled to place their 
refuse at the curbside, outside of their curtilage, each week, for 
pick-up by Provo City garbage trucks. They were prohibited from 
accumulating trash on the premises. They were further prohibited 
from disposing of their trash other than by way of Provo City's 
"mandatory" residential trash collection service. Defendants did 
not abandon their trash in the sense that they placed it at the 
street for any and all passers-by to rummage through. Rather, the 
trash was placed on the street in reasonable reliance that it would 
be handled only by Provo City trash collectors, consistent with the 
above-noted ordinances. Defendants had no choice but to place the 
garbage on the street. It is contrary to constitutional concepts of 
citizens' security in their property to mandate them by ordinance 
to place it in an area where it will be subject to search by the 
The residence in the case before this Court does not contain more than 
two dwelling units. 
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very government which compelled them to place it there in the first 
place. 
The Utah Supreme Court has already decided a case which is 
substantially analogous to the case before this Court. In State v. 
Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, Defendants sought protection under Article 
I, Section 14 from the government's search of their bank records 
held by their banks. The banks and not the Defendants had been the 
subject of the searches. Defendants asserted a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the bank records held by their banks, 
notwithstanding that the United States Supreme Court had previously 
held that no such expectation of privacy was recognized under the 
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.56 Noting 
that other state courts had rejected the Miller holding under their 
state constitutions, and further noting that such other state 
courts "found the rationale in Katz v United States, that !the 
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, f to be more 
persuasive than that of Miller f,1" the Court agreed with Defendants 
that Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution recognized a 
right of privacy in Defendants to the bank records held by their 
banks. 
Justice Zimmerman, concurring in the holding of Thompson, 
stated: 
[w]e are rejecting the argument advanced by the State 
that we should follow federal standing law and deny those 
CO 
United States v Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
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not directly subjected to the search any right to 
challenge its legality. [Citations.] 
I find this entirely appropriate. Even where federal 
rights are at stake, standing law is state law, and we 
are not bound to follow federal precedent.[Citation.] In 
the area of search and seizure, the federal courts have 
developed extraordinarily restrictive doctrines that have 
the effect, if not the purpose, of placing a large 
percentage of illegal activities beyond the scrutiny of 
the courts. [Citations.] I see no reason for us to follow 
suit, especially when state constitutional rights, which 
we have a peculiar obligation to protect are at stake. 
Because the court m Thompson found defendants had standing to 
challenge the search, it also necessarily found Defendants had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the records left with their 
banks.59 Justice Zimmerman emphasized two important points in his 
concurring opinion: a) standing (and therefore a determination of a 
claim of a reasonable expectation of privacy) is a state law 
question, and b) restrictive federal doctrines that serve to 
insulate illegal searches from judicial scrutiny should not be 
adhered to by this State. Thompson therefore stands for the 
principal that determining the reasonableness of one's expectation 
of privacy (the issue raised in this case by these Defendants) is a 
state law issue and that the guidelines developed by federal 
decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment should not necessarily 
be followed (primacy model). 
Defendants argue that Thompson allows, if not directs, this 
Court to make an independent determination under Article I, Section 
14 of the Utah Constitution, of whether Defendants have a 
See Rakas v Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
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reasonable expectation of privacy in their residential garbage left 
at curbside. Defendant's argue that Thompson further suggests that 
Fourth Amendment principals and holdings in this regard are not 
controlling in such determination. Defendants lastly argue that the 
reasoning of the dissent in Greenwood as well as the holdings of 
Krivda, Tanaka, Hempele, Boland, and Moran should serve as guidance 
in the determination. 
C. Good Faith exception viz a viz Article I, Section 14, 
Constitution of Utah 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that an exclusionary rule does 
apply to violations of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution,60 however, it does not appear that Utah Appellate 
courts have decided whether a good faith exception similar to the 
one set forth in United State v Leon is applicable to violations of 
Article I, Section 14. Defendants argue that no good faith 
exception should save improperly issued search warrants from the 
effect of the Utah Constitutional exclusionary rule. At least one 
Utah appellate Justice has opined that "a healthy skepticism should 
permeate the court's consideration [of a good faith exception to 
Article I, Section 14] in view of the troublesome analysis in 
Leon,bl and the Supreme Court noted, without comment, that 
Larocco, above; Thompson, above. 
61State v Rowe. 806 P.2d 730, 743 (Ut. App. 1991). 
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Connecticut has found a good faith exception incompatible with its 
constitution.62 
States that have rejected a good faith exception to their 
state constitutions are as follows. New York, People v. Biaelow, 
488 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y., 1985) (exclusionary rule's purpose would be 
frustrated, a premium would be placed on illegal police action, 
would create incentive to others to act illegally); Michigan, 
People v Sundlinq, 395 N.W.2nd 308 (Mich. App. 1986) (exclusionary 
rule in its present form is necessary to preservation of right to 
be free from unreasonable government intrusion); New Jersey, State 
v Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820 (N.J., 1987) (would undermine police 
motivation to comply with constitutional requirement of probable 
cause, would diminish quality of evidence presented in search 
warrant applications); North Carolina, State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 
553 (N.C., 1988) (judicial integrity demands suppression of 
illegally obtained evidence); Connecticut, State v Marsala, 579 
A.2d 58 (Conn., 1990) (would discourage thorough police work, would 
discourage proper care taken by magistrates, would encourage 
reviewing courts to simply look for good faith instead of reviewing 
the probable cause requirement); Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v. 
Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Penn., 1991) (would clash with strong right 
of privacy guaranteed in the Pennsylvania Constitution); Vermont, 
State v Oakes, 598 A.2d 119 (Vt., 1991) (Vermont is not persuaded 
Thompson, above, n.4. 
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that the cost/benefit analysis of Leon is accurate); Idaho, State 
v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660 (Id., 1992) ("we finally and unequivocally 
no longer adhere to a policy of sheepishly following in the 
footsteps of the U.S. Supreme Court in the area of state 
constitutional analysis." the good faith exception is ill 
conceived); New Mexico, State v, Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052 (N.M., 
1993) (incompatible with the New Mexico Constitution). 
Defendants argue that the reasoning of the states that have 
rejected the good faith exception for their own constitutions is 
compelling. Utah should not undermine the integrity of the 
judiciary, emasculate Article I, Section 14, encourage sloppy 
police work, or encourage lazy magisterial, trial, and appellate 
court review by adopting a good faith exception to the State's 
constitution. 
POINT III 
The evidence obtained must be suppressed because 
the Defendants' fundamental rights were violated 
In State v. Rowe, 850 P.2d 427,429 (Utah 1993) (Rowe II) the 
Utah Supreme Court held that "suppression of evidence is an 
appropriate remedy for illegal police conduct only when that 
conduct implicates a fundamental violation of a Defendant's 
rights." In State v. Simmons, 866 P.2d 614 (Ut. App., 1993) the 
Utah Court of Appeals, citing to Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 
(1978) held "[t]he proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden 
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of establishing that his [or her] own Fourth Amendment rights were 
violated by the challenged search."63 
In this matter, if the evidence found in the garbage 
containers did not provide the issuing magistrate with a fair 
probability to conclude contraband was probably in Defendants1 
residence, or if this Court finds the warrantless search of the 
Defendants' garbage containers was unconstitutional under Article 
I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, the warrant was improperly 
issued. Because, as argued above, the warrant cannot be saved by 
the Leon "good faith" exception, or, alternatively, if this Court 
concludes that a Leon type "good faith// exception is not 
appropriate in an interpretation of the Utah Constitution, the 
search was illegal. Because the police did not have an alternative 
authority to enter the residence (as in Rowe II64), the search 
necessarily violated each Defendant's fundamental rights. 
6 3See a l s o S t a t e v R i b e , 876 P .2d 403 (Ut . A p p . , 1 9 9 4 ) . 
64 
Rowe I I . a t 4 2 9 - 4 3 0 . 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The warrant in this case was improperly issued under both the 
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution because the 
supporting affidavit did not provide the magistrate with a fair 
probability to conclude contraband was probably in the house where 
the officers were directed by the warrant- A good faith exception 
does not apply in these circumstances, either because the officer's 
actions fell under one of the four recognized exceptions to the 
exception of United States v. Leon or because there is no good 
faith exception to the Utah Constitution. Consequently all evidence 
derived as a direct or indirect65 result of service of the warrant 
should be suppressed.^ 
Dated this sp(\ day of August, 1996. 
Thomas H. Means 
Attorney for Defendants/ 
Appellants 
65Wona Sun v United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
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ADDENDUM 
Ruling on Defendants' Motion to Suppress 
Affidavit in Support of and Request for Search Warrant 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT^<S2 lQ ™JK 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH QlX~' 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
PATRICIA E. SMITH, 
RAQUEL NIELSEN, 
BRENT JACKSON, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
CASE NO. 941400506 
CASE NO. 941400507 
CASE NO. 941400508 
DATE: March 23, 1995 
JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS 
This matter came before the Court on Defendants' Motion to suppress. Oral arguments 
were heard on February 7, 1995. Defendants appeared and were represented by Thomas H. 
Means, with the State being represented by James R. Taylor, Deputy Utah County Attorney. 
The Court, after carefully considering the memoranda and oral arguments, now enters the 
following: 
RULING 
L 
FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
On the eighth of June 1994, Sergeant Jerry Harper, of the Provo Police Department 
searched the trash receptacles, (two), of the Defendants' home after they had been placed in 
the street for collection. According to the information in the affidavit in support of the 
requested warrant, the officer identified no reason for the search of the trash cans. He did, 
however, mention two previous incidents which implicated the residents in drug involvement: 
1 
1) approximately 36 days prior to the search of the trash receptacles, one of the residents pled 
guilty to possession of marijuana and paraphernalia; 2) approximately 56 days prior to the 
search of the receptacles, two of the residents were involved in an incident where several men 
entered their home and held them captive while demanding money and drugs. 
Sergeant Harper found within the receptacles some marijuana stems, seeds, Zig-Zag 
papers, and a small "piece" of marijuana. Also found was some personal correspondence with 
the names of two of the residents of the home in question. Based on the results of the search 
an affidavit was prepared and submitted to a magistrate. The Affidavit also mentioned the 
prior drug-related incidents. A warrant was issued for the home, and further evidence was 
found during the search of the home. Defendants were arrested and charged with possession 
of drugs and paraphernalia. 
IL 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
(1) Is the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant fatally flawed, and 
therefore, lacking a substantial basis for issuance of a warrant? 
(2) Do Utah citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy in trash placed in a city 
provided container and left at the edge of the city street for pickup? 
IIL 
DISCUSSION 
A. Sufficiency of the Affidavit 
Defendants argue that some of the information contained in the Affidavit in support of 
the warrant is irrelevant. This Court agrees. Several of the paragraphs in the Affidavit 
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include information which is spurious to the magistrate's determination of probable cause. 
However, such information does not invalidate the warrant. The burden placed upon the State 
in placing an affidavit before a magistrate is "a reasonable belief that the evidence sought is 
located at the place indicated by the policeman's affidavit." State v. Brooks. 849 P.2d 640, 
643 (Utah App. 1993). Assuming, arguendo, that all the paragraphs mentioned by Defendants 
in their memorandum were determined to be irrelevant, and therefore, removed from 
consideration, State v. Potter. 860 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1993), there is still sufficient 
information in the affidavit to establish probable cause. Under Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213 
(1983), a "totality of the circumstances" analysis is proper and, even with the limited 
information left after removing the alleged irrelevant information, a magistrate could have a 
reasonable belief that the "evidence sought," (drugs), would be found "at the place indicated." 
Brooks. 849 P.2d at 643. 
Defendants' argument that the evidence in the trash receptacles was 'stale' is 
unpersuasive. While it is conceivable that the trash could have been there for longer than a 
week, it is reasonable for the magistrate to conclude that the trash had been in the containers 
for a week or less. Thus a "common-sense reading of the affidavit" would suggest that drugs 
would probably be in the home. State v. Hansen. 732 P.2d 127, 131 (Utah 1987). 
Defendants' argument that the prior bad acts were stale or improper may have some 
validity. Sergeant Harper does appear to justify his search of the trash receptacles by 
including references to prior involvement and alleged involvement with drugs. (See Affidavit 
paragraphs 2 & 3). While Defendants do not support their position with any case law or 
3 
firm 
statutory claim, it does strike the Court as improper to justify a search on the prior history of 
the individuals to be searched. 
Other arguments made by the Defendants are neither persuasive nor supported by 
substantive law. The Court finds that the Affidavit is not fatally flawed and that a 
substantial basis existed in the Affidavit, under current law, for the magistrate to issue the 
warrant. 
B. The Right of Piivacy in Garbage under the Federal Constitution and the Utah 
Constitution. 
The next issue to be resolved is whether Utah citizens have a protectable expectation 
of privacy in garbage placed in a city provided container and left at the edge of the street for 
pickup? This issue has two parts: 1) The protection of an expectation of privacy in garbage 
allowed by the provisions of the U.S. Constitution and federal case law; and 2) The 
protection of an expectation of privacy in garbage under the provisions of the Utah 
Constitution. 
1. Protection under the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. 
The controlling federal case is California v. Greenwood. 486 U.S. 35 (1988), which 
establishes the principle that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in trash placed 
outside the curtilage of the home. Id. at 37. The Supreme Court did not address whether 
searches of garbage left within the curtilage of the home were prohibited under the Fourth 
Amendment. Id. While the present case is similar to Greenwood, it can, contrary to the 
assertions of the State, be distinguished from Greenwood. In Greenwood, the police officer 
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had received information from an informant that illicit drugs had been shipped to the address 
in question, and acting on that information began a surveillance of the home. Based on 
suspicious activity at the address in the course of the surveillance, the officer searched the 
trash and found sufficient evidence to establish the probable cause necessary for issuance of a 
warrant. IdL at 37-38. In the instant case, much of what supported the actions of the police in 
the Greenwood case is lacking. However, in spite of these distinguishing facts the warrantless 
search of the garbage in the instant case did not violate the two prong test of Greenwood. Id. 
at 39. 
In applying the first part of the Greenwood test the United States Supreme Court held 
that such warrantless searches "would violate the Fourth Amendment only if [defendants had] 
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in their garbage . . ." Id. While no affidavits 
or other evidence were submitted with memoranda to show that defendants had such an 
expectation of privacy in their garbage, counsel at oral argument offered to have defendants 
testify to that fact. The Court declined such testimony as being unnecessary to reach a 
determination on the expectations of the defendants. For the purposes of this opinion, it will 
be accepted that the defendants had such an expectation of privacy; this, however, is not the 
end of the federal protection examination. 
The second part of the Greenwood test must also be met before protection is warranted 
under the Fourth Amendment — the expectation of privacy must be one that "society accepts 
as objectively reasonable.'1 Id. The U.S. Supreme Court in Greenwood determined that such 
an expectation of privacy in garbage is not reasonable when the garbage is placed on the curb 
or alongside the street because it then becomes vulnerable to an unscrupulous person or 
5 
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scavenging animal. Because a reasonable person would know that such garbage is available 
to curious members of the public, any expectation of privacy is unreasonable. A reasonable 
person cannot expect "police . . .to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that 
could have been observed by any member of the public." Id. at 41. 
In the instant case, the Defendants left their garbage at the edge of the city street, 
outside of the curtilage of the home, for collection where it was available for the possible 
perusal of anyone who wished to take the time to do so. Therefore, there is no question that 
the second test under Greenwood has not been met. However, the U.S. Supreme Court also 
suggested that "States may surely construe their own constitutions as imposing more stringent 
constraints on police conduct than does the Federal Constitution." Id at 43. The Court 
recognizes that while a state may not construe its own state constitution to infringe upon the 
rights set forth in the Federal Constitution, a state may provide for greater protection of its 
citizens' rights than that provided by the Federal Constitution. Therefore, this Court must yet 
consider whether the subject search was a violation of state guarantees embodied in the Utah 
State Constitution. 
2. Protection under the Utah Constitution. 
There are some additional facts, established from the presentation of evidence through 
proffer and by the Court taking judicial notice, which are pertinent to the state constitutional 
analysis. These facts are: 1) garbage containers in the city of Provo are owned and supplied 
by the city; 2) garbage collection occurs weekly and on a day certain; 3) collection is made 
by city employees in city owned trucks; 4) the garbage containers in question were owned by 
the city of Provo; 5) the garbage container in question was placed on city property, 
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ostensibly for collection purposes, and was outside the curtilage of the residence; 6) no local 
ordinance exists which prohibits any person from disturbing garbage placed on a public street 
for collection or in anyway restricting access to such garbage. 
The final issue is whether there is a greater protection of one's expectation of privacy 
in garbage under the Utah Constitution. Specifically, does Utah society, under the state 
constitution, accept as objectively reasonable, an expectation of privacy in garbage? 
Defendants argue that the history of Utah is unique and supports a societal expectation 
that individuals have a reasonable belief that their garbage would be free from governmental 
intrusion. The original pioneer settlers of the region suffered much at the hands of various 
state governments because of their religious beliefs and communal, ecclesiastically directed 
society. In three different states the government either ignored or condoned the persecution 
which was suffered by those who would eventually flee to, and settle the Utah basin. Even 
after this region was settled, the people, especially the society leaders, continued to suffer 
persecution at the hands of federal officials who often conducted searches and seizures of 
homes and effects without warrants in an attempt to enforce the anti-polygamy laws. (See 
Defendants' Memorandum pp. 24 - 25). Defendants, therefore, argue that such actions created 
distrust and suspicion of government on the part of the drafters of the Utah Constitution. 
This mistrust and suspicion would have motivated them to expect greater protection against 
such invasions of privacy from the provisions of the state constitution. Ironically, the 
wording of the appropriate provision, Article I, Section 14, of the Utah Constitution is nearly 
identical to the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and therefore, at first glance 
would appear to hold the same level of protection as does the Federal Constitution. 
7 
Whether the Utah constitution supports an expectation of privacy in trash is unresolved 
in Utah. Other states have found that an expectation of privacy is reasonable under their state 
constitutions. While the determination of other sovereign states is not determinative of the 
question, the rationale and reasoning used by them may be helpful in considering the issue. 
The Supreme Court of New Jersey found in State v. Hempele. 576 A.2d 793, (N.J. 
1990), that under the relevant provision of that state Constitution, Article I, Section 7, an 
expectation of privacy need only be reasonable.1 Icl at 802. The facts in Hempele, (which 
was a consolation of two cases), are similar to the facts in the instant case; the garbage was 
placed for collection near the street and then removed by police and searched. The New 
Jersey court appears to reach its conclusion based on concerns that "[cjlues to people's most 
private affairs can be found in their garbage. . . . A plethora of personal information can be 
culled from garbage: a single bag of trash testifies eloquently to the eating, reading, and 
recreational habits of the person who produced it." Hempele 576 A.2d at 802-803. Further, 
local ordinances prohibited "any person to * * * disturb * * * garbage * * * placed on any 
curb, street or public place." Id at 805, (citation omitted). 
The Supreme Court of Indiana also found that an expectation of privacy in garbage is 
reasonable. Moran v. Indiana. 625 N.E. 1231 (Ind. 1993). The facts of the Indiana case are 
again similar to the instant case: garbage had been placed in plastic containers and set out for 
1
 The New Jersey Constitution reads lfThe right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the papers and things to be seized." 
N.J. Const, of 1947 art.I, para 7. 
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collection at the end of the residential driveway approximately a foot from the street. The 
containers held several opaque plastic bags which the police removed and searched. In 
Mo ran the court stated that "[ujnder Indiana law, warrantless searches are presumptively 
unreasonable, and the burden is placed on the state to show that the search falls within one of 
the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. The common thread underlying the 
recognized exceptions is the concept of Exigent circumstances1 which render the procurement 
of a warrant impractical or inadvisable because of a danger of harm to individuals or the 
potential destruction of evidence." Id. at 1239. The court went on to find that no exigent 
circumstances existed, and therefore, the search of the garbage violated the protection against 
unreasonable search and seizure found in Art. I, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution.2 
In State v. Tanaka, 701 P.2d 1274 (Hawaii 1985), the Supreme Court of Hawaii found 
that an expectation of privacy existed in garbage. The facts of the Tanaka case, which entail 
three consolidated cases, are similar to the instant case but there is one important 
distinguishing characteristic—the garbage searched was located within the private property of 
the individual being charged. Thus, the police had to trespass onto the private property to 
gain access to the garbage searched. However, in at least one of the three consolidated cases 
the garbage was at the curbside of the defendants property. In the view of the Hawaii court, 
the Hawaii Constitution, article I, § 7 "recognizes an expectation of privacy beyond the 
2
 The Indiana Constitution reads: "The right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects 
against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated; 
and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or thing to be seized." Article I, § 11, 
Indiana Constitution. 
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parallel provisions in the Federal Bill of Rights." IcL at 1276. The Hawaii court went on to 
say: 
[p]eople reasonably believe that police will not indiscriminately rummage through their 
trash bags to discover their personal effects. Business records, bills, correspondence, 
magazines, tax records, and other telltale refuse can reveal much about a person's 
activities, associations, and beliefs. If we were to hold otherwise, police could search 
everyone's trash bags on their property without any reason and thereby learn of their 
activities, associations, and beliefs. It is exactly this type of overbroad governmental 
intrusion that article I, § 7 of the Hawaii Constitution was intended to prevent.3 
Tanaka 701 P.2d at 1276, 1277. 
The Hawaii court explained that an expectation of privacy did not preclude any 
searches by police of garbage but required that a warrant be obtained or that exigent 
circumstances be shown which would reasonably justify a warrantless search. I<I 
The state of Washington also has found an expectation of privacy in garbage under the 
Washington State Constitution. In State v. Boland. 800 P.2d 1112 (Wash. 1990), 
Washington's highest court utilized criteria previously set down in State v. GunwalL 720 P.2d 
3
 The text of article I, § 7 of the Hawaii Constitution 
reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches, 
seizures and invasions of privacy shall not be violated; and 
no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized 
or the communications sought to be intercepted. 
Interestingly enough the Hawaii Constitution has an 
additional provision regarding the right of privacy. This is 
article I, § 6, which reads: 
The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall 
not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state 
interest. The legislature shall take affirmative steps to 
implement this right. 
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808 (Wash 1986) 1) textual differences can provide a basis for a conclusion which would 
differ from that reached under the Federal Constitution, 2) differences in parallel provisions 
of the state and federal constitutions could dictate varying conclusions, 3) State common law 
history may reflect an intention to confer greater protection than the federal provisions; 4) 
Previously established state law may provide the basis to define the scope of a state 
constitutional right; 5) Differences in structure of the constitutions may require disparate 
results, (e.g the state may guarantee rights which are not protected on a federal level), 6) 
The matter may be of particular state or local interest Gunwall. 720 P 2d at 812, 813 
The Washington Supreme Court rejected the federal analysis stating that M[w]hile a 
person must reasonably expect a licensed trash collector will remove the contents of his trash 
can, this expectation does not also infer an expectation of governmental intrusion " Boland. 
800 P.2d at 1117. Further, the Washington court using the criteria set forth in Gunwall found 
that a search of garbage was an intrusion into the private affairs and therefore a violation of 
the Washington Constitution, Art I, § 7 / Id. at 1114-1116 
Of the states which have found a greater protection of an expectation of privacy than 
the federal scheme allows, two have significant constitutional textual differences from the 
Fourth Amendment, both Hawaii and Washington have unique and explicit wording which 
lends itself to a broader reading of protection than found in the Fourth Amendment 
Indiana and New Jersey, on the other hand, have state constitutional provisions which 
are nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment and the Utah provision In both the Indiana 
4
 The Washington Constitution provides at Art. I, § 7 that: 
"No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home 
invaded, without authority of law.11 
11 
and New Jersey cases, the facts were essentially the same as in the instant case, and the 
highest state court still found a heightened level of protection of an expectation of privacy in 
garbage. 
However, while recognizing that some states have found a greater level of privacy 
protection in their state constitutions, this Court must also recognize that the majority of states 
have followed the federal analysis, and have not found independent grounds to provide for 
greater protection than that provided by the Fourth Amendment in this area.5 
5
 Hillman v. State, 834 P.2d 1271 (Colo. 1992) (defendant 
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage bags left at 
curb for collection); Walls v. State, 536 So.2d 137, 138-39 (Ala. 
Crim. App. 1988), cert, denied, 490 U.S. 1020 (1989) (search of 
defendant's garbage located in front of his residence did not 
violate a proprietary interest in it, citing Greenwood); State 
v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 157 n. 14, cert, denied, 502 U.S. 919, 
112 S.Ct. 330 (Conn. 1991) (observed that trash bags, while 
closed containers, may not carry a reasonable expectation of 
privacy when placed beyond the curtilage of a home for 
collection); State v. Fisher, 591 So.2d 1049, 1050 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1991) (concluded that defendants sufficiently exposed 
their garbage to the public to defeat Fourth Amendment protection 
when placing it in plastic cans located in front of the house on 
the road right-of-way); Perkins v. State, 398 S.E.2d 702, 704 
(Ga. App. 1990) (followed Greenwood); People v. Collins, 478 
N.E.2d 267, 278-79, cert, denied, 474 U.S. 935 (111. 1985) (found 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in a garbage bag left on a 
second floor landing of an outside stairway because such area was 
an openly accessible common area of the apartment building); 
State v. Henderson, 435 N.W.2d 394 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (found no 
violation of the Iowa Constitution where evidence was seized from 
trash bags that were tied shut and placed in metal garbage cans) ; 
In re Forfeiture of U.S. Currency, 450 N.W.2d 93, 94 (Mich. App. 
1989) (followed Greenwood); State v. Krech, 403 N.W.2d 634, 
637-38 (Minn. 1987) (concluded that defendants did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage wrapped in plastic 
bags and placed in cans in back of a duplex a few feet away from 
an alley where defendant's customers typically walked near the 
garbage in route to the back entrance); State v. Texel, 4 33 
N.W.2d 541, 543 (Neb. 1989) (held that no reasonable expectation 
of privacy exists in garbage which has been made accessible to 
the public); Commonwealth v. Perdue, 564 A.2d 489, 493 (Pa. 
Super. 1989), appeal denied, 574 A.2d 68 (1990) (found no 
12 
In the states which found a level of privacy protection greater than the federal scheme, 
the reasoning appears to center on a philosophical argument—that unless restraints are placed 
on the police powers of government, those who exercise those powers will abuse it. There is 
no question that the general public would be incensed if the police began to randomly pick up 
garbage placed in front of residences1 looking for evidence of wrongdoing. Even those 
citizens who are model citizens would likely become paranoid about their lives and examine 
each item discarded, looking for anything which could or might lead to possible arrest or even 
public embarrassment. Such arguments have a certain attractiveness in that they are easily 
reconciled with the underlying rationale of the protection inherent in the Bill of Rights. 
However, philosophical arguments are often stretched too far. The mere parading of a list of 
horribles does not make them a reality. The reality of budgetary and personnel constraints 
placed upon police make such actions unlikely. In the various cases examined by this Court 
the police have not randomly selected an individual's garbage, but have had a reasonable 
suspicion that illegal activity was taking place within the house from which the garbage came. 
Reaching a balance between the two conflicting ideas of personal liberty and 
communal safety requires a constant shifting of resources and authority because societal 
values change. Not long ago, each home would burn its own garbage and spread the ashes to 
the wind—today society does not accept such practices as beneficial to the community. 
Society has developed different technology to handle the garbage produced in day-to-day 
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left for collection 
subject to public inspection); State v. Stevens, 367 N.W.2d 788, 
797, cert, denied, 474 U.S. 852 (Wis. 1985) (found that, as trash 
moves farther from the home, any expectation of privacy in it is 
diminished). 
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living. These technology changes have influenced the way we, as a society, view persona! 
liberty. Any determination of the expectations of society must be weighed against the norms 
of today, as influenced by the past, but not by the values and standards of the past. 
In our highly mobile society it would be difficult for someone to remember which 
states accept an expectation of privacy in garbage and which do not. A uniform standard has 
great appeal because of the certainty and stability which it engenders. However, uniformity 
benefits Jtf are not, standing alone, sufficient to determine whether Utah society accepts the 
federal scheme of privacy protection in garbage. 
The Utah Supreme Court has not addressed expectation of privacy in garbage directly. 
The Utah Supreme Court has, however, on at least one occasion interpreted the provisions of 
the Utah Constitution in a manner which may be read to expand the civil liberties of the 
citizens of Utah beyond the federal threshold. See State v. Thompson. 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 
1991), (recognized an expectation of privacy in bank records under state constitution where 
the federal constitution does not). The facts of Thompson are sufficiently different from the 
instant case to distinguish it from the instant case and for Thompson to be insufficient to 
support a greater expectation of privacy in garbage under the Utah Constitution than the 
Federal Constitution. 
It seems to this Court that any decision which announces a heightened expectation of 
privacy in garbage, under a state constitutional analysis, must fairly, reasonably, and clearly 
articulate the reasons. Any such decision should not simply be an attempt to viscerally 
sidestep Greenwood. The minority arguments in Greenwood are compelling and persuasive, 
in the estimation of this Court, but they have failed in every jurisdiction in this country which 
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has considered the issue under a Fourth Amendment analysis, and prevailed in only two 
jurisdictions, Indiana and New Jersey, under a state constitutional analysis where the facts are 
anywhere similar to this case. 
Regardless of how persuaded this Court is by the minority view in Greenwood, this 
Court cannot reasonably find anything in Utah's unique constitutional history which would 
dictate a result different from Greenwood. A recitation of Utah Mormon pioneer polygamous 
battles with federal agents is interesting, but far from relevant and convincing on the very 
narrow issue before this Court. A mere substitution of a result this Court favors, without 
setting forth concrete, objective, substantive, and articulable considerations, is judicially 
disingenuous, and therefore, would simply subordinate the Fourth Amendment result to this 
Court's personal predilections. Certainly that is no way to adopt a body of state constitutional 
law which would give any guidance and direction. The Court suggests that major departures 
from soundly established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence should be announced by Utah's 
appellate courts, not by trial court judges. 
Lastly, even if this Court were to find a heightened expectation of privacy in garbage 
under a state constitutional analysis, this Court, similar to Moran v. Indiana, 625 N.E. 2d 
1231,1240, would sustain the subject search. In Moran the Indiana Supreme Court applied a 
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained during a warrantless search 
of garbage put out for disposal, even though the Court later found the search violated its state 
constitution. ]A Here, as there, no state court precedent addressed the constitutionality of 
searches of garbage. The Indiana court held that it was reasonable for the police to conclude 
that the defendants lacked a privacy interest in the garbage. 
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n A n r\ r\ r\ 
Because the Utah Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of an expectation 
of privacy in garbage, and no support is found in state lower court rulings to support a result 
different from the federal model, the federal threshold must prevail. This Court, while 
acknowledging the compelling arguments on both sides of the issue, therefore, determines that 
no reasonable expectation of privacy exists as to the trash placed by Defendants in containers 
owned and provided by the city, and left in the street for collection by city employees. 
Neither, the Fourth Amendment, nor Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution is 
implicated and, therefore, no warrant was necessary to conduct the search. 
IV. 
DECISION 
(1) The probable cause Affidavit, filed in support of the search warrant, while arguably 
containing spurious information, is not fatally flawed and a magistrate could reasonably 
believe that the evidence sought would be found in the home. Accordingly, the motion to 
quash the warrant is denied. 
(2) The search of trash, placed in a city owned receptacle, left on the city street, with the 
anticipation that it would be picked up by city employees, is not a violation of Defendants' 
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Fourth Amendment rights nor in violation of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
THEREFORE, Defendants' Motion to Suppress is denied. 
Dated at Provo, Utah, this^J? day o f / ^ / / ^ / ^ — 7 1 9 9 5 . 
BY THE COURT 
cc: Thomas H. Means, Esq. 
James R. Taylor, Esq. 
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IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, EX PARTE, 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
A NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
OF AND REQUEST FOR 
SEARCH WARRANT 
Comes now Jerry Harper, having been duly sworn, who deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. I am a sergeant with the Provo Police Department. I have 
been a peace officer since 1979 when I graduated from POST as the 
officer with the highest academic achievement in my class. During 
the time I have been a peace officer I have received over 225 hours 
of specialized training for law enforcement work including 185 
hours of training specific to narcotics work. Narcotics classes 
include training in surveillance, operation of surveillance and 
electronic investigatory equipment, field testing of drugs and drug 
recognition. As an officer I have participated in hundreds of 
operations involving the undercover purchase of narcotics and/or 
the arrest of persons for substance abuse related violations. I 
have experience working undercover providing first hand experience 
with narcotics trafficking. I have supervised narcotics 
investigations for the Provo Police Department since 1992. I am 
currently designated as the department trainer/specialist in the 
areas of fingerprinting, surveillance, video equipment, narcotics 
and drug recognition. 
2. On April 13, 1994, several unidentified men entered the 
home of Pat Smith and Brent Jackson at 770 South 103 3 West in Provo 
at 7:15 a.m. without permission. According to Smith and Jackson 
the men held them captive for several hours demanding drugs and 
money. The men wanted to know where the drugs were. 
-*% 
3. On May 3, 1994, Pat Smith plead guilty to possession of 
marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia in the Fourth 
Circuit Court. The crimes were alleged to have occurred January 
15, 1993 at the home of Linda Cannon in Orem. 
4. Provo City has a solid waste collection system. Each home 
is assigned a specific can which is owned by the city. An 
additional can may be obtained for an additional fee, Once___per 
week_ the cans are to be placed at curbside or in the street for 
collection. A city truck then mechanically picks up and empties 
the cans. 
5. On June 8, in the early morning hours, I went to the home 
of Pat Smith at 770 South 1033 West in Provo. There were two cans 
with the number "1033" stenciled in white paint on the side in the 
street in front of the house. I took the cans to the Police 
Department where I reviewed the contents. After I had finished I 
replaced the garbage in the cans and returned them to the street in 
front of the house. 
6. Within the cans I found marijuana stems, seeds, a 
marijuana cigarette along with zig-zag papers and a small piece of 
marijuana. I tested the small piece with a chemical reagent test 
which indicated positive for marijuana. 
7. I also found correspondence with the address of 770 South 
103 3 West, Provo and the names of Pat Smith and Brent Jackson. The 
correspondence included a utility bill to Brent Jackson for natural 
gas. A phone bill for Brent and Pat Jackson was also located. 
8. The amounts of stems, seeds and marijuana in the garbage 
.imply possession of small__ ainounts_ for use. Such amounts of 
marijuana are typically packaged in bags of 1/8 ounce or less, 
quite small in volume. Such bags can quickly and easily be hidden 
in clothing or destroyed if notice is given of intent to search. 
9. Marijuana and paraphernalia are often kept in outbuildings 
and vehicles. Failure to search the curtilage of the residence 
together with the person of individuals present and vehicles 
located on the curtilage will likely result in officer's missing 
important evidence. 
10. It is my experience that most of the people I have 
encountered in connection with the unlawful use of marijuana also 
occasionally sell, sometimes paying for their use with profit from 
sales. It is so common as to be the rule rather than the 
exception, to find evidence related to production and/or 
distribution whenever marijuana is located in a residence. 
11. The residence is more particularly described as a two 
story duplex with tan brick and brown wood on the front. On the 
side the brick extends to the eaves. There is a carport on either 
side. The roof is gravel. The duplex is on the south side of 770 
South and faces north. "1033" is the west residence with the 
number "1033" mounted to the right of the door as you face the 
door. 
12. I expect to locate additional controlled substances in the 
residence together with associated paraphernalia including items 
used or capable of use for the storage, use, production, or 
Discovery Sent To 
distribution of marijuana. 
WHEREFORE, your affiant requests that a warrant be issued by 
this Court authorizing a search of the residence together with the 
curtilage and the person of all vehicles and individuals present 
within the home and curtilage at the time of the search for the 
presence of controlled substances together with associated 
paraphernalia including items used or capable of use for the 
storage, use, production, or distribution of marijuana to be 
executed without notice of intent or authority in the daytime. 
Dated this ^ Tday of June, 199^/, jr^ .m. 
C^uO£^. 
Affiant£/ 
F^-J ? Subscribed .to and sworn before me this 0 day of 
A A I 1994, ££7m. 
-^>is^O\ 
^-
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